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In the S11preme Court 
of the State of Utah 
C. A. NASNER, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
F. G. BURTON, doing business as F. 
G. BURTON CO., RULON BUR-
TON, HUBERT COCHRAN and E. 
J. HOLDER,. Defendants. 
Case No. 8032 
Brief of Defendants and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought by plaintiff to recover damages 
for the claimed breach of a contract to sell his business to the 
defendants for $3 300.00. Plaintiff had refused defendants' 
offer to perform, because he had received a better offer; when 
such better offer failed to materialize, plaintiff sued the defend-
ants and was awarded damages of $2550.00. Defendants appeal 
from such judgment. 
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Plaintiff is the owner and operator of a street and store front 
decorating business, with principal place of business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. In advance of holidays and public celebrations, 
plaintiff solicits cities, towns and business houses and secures 
contracts to hang flags, pennants and banners above streets, side-
walks and to decorate store fronts, all in a manner in keeping 
with the theme of the holiday or celebration in question. The 
flags, pennants, banners and other materials are furnished by 
plaintiff from his inventory. 
In the spring of 1951 plaintiff and defendants F~ G. 
Burton and Rulon Burton, a partnership, doing business 
as F. G. Burton Company, and defendant Hubert Cochran en-
tered into negotiations with plaintiffs whereby the latter was 
to sell his business to all three defendants. The sale covered the 
l 
plaintiff's supply of flags, pennants, banners, ropes, ladders 
and other materials, including good will, but did not include the 
plaintiff's automotive equipment. 
On or about June 19, 1951, (R. 140), plaintiff and de-
fendants met at plaintiff's place of business in Salt Lake City, . 
Utah, and completed arrangements for the sale. Under these 
arrangements $3300.00 was agreed upon as the total purchase 
price (R. 3,5). The time of payment of the purchase price, and 
the delivery of the inventory, was to be when plaintiff returned 
from a trip to Elko, Nevada, where he was engaged in deco-
rating work (R. 107, 108, 129, 161-162). Defendants ·testified 
that the sale was to be conditioned upon plaintiff furnishing 
defendants with an inventory and bill of sale (R. 108, 131, 
161). Plaintiff testified (R. 43) that the time of payment of 
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the purchase price was to be when he returned from Elko, and 
that he told defendants at the June 19th meeting he woula be 
in Elko approximately ten days (R. 83). 
On the strength of the agreement reached at the June 
19th meeting, defendants thereafter hired one E. J. Holder 
to solicit business and obtain decorating contracts for the forth-
coming Days of '47 events in Salt Lake City, Utah, commemo-
rating the July Twenty-fourth holiday (R. 117, 133). As a 
result of these efforts defendants obtained approximately sixty 
customers' contracts. The evidence established that plaintiff 
was the only person engaged in this kind of business in Salt 
Lake City and that his nearest competitor was a Mr. Barnes, 
who carried on his business in Provo. 
Plaintiff stated on the witness stand that he returned to 
Salt Lake on June 25th (R. 43) and that on that date he made 
one telephone call (R. 84) to the office of defendants F. G. 
Burton and Rulon Burton. Plaintiff further testified that he 
talked with Rulon Burton on this occasion and told him he was 
in town, and that defendant Rulon Burton advised plaintiff 
that defendant F. G. Burton was not at the office but that he, 
Rulon Burton, would let F. G. Burton know that plaintiff 
had called (R. 44) . Defendant Rulon Burton denied getting 
a telephone call from plaintiff on June 25th (R. 119). Plain-
tiff remained in Salt Lake City only one day, June 25th, and 
the next day, June 26th, returned to Elko (R. 45). After his 
arrival back in Elko, plaintiff received an offer from his em-
ployee, one Jim Mull, to purchase plaintiff's business for 
$4,000.00 (R. 95). 
Plaintiff testified that he returned to Salt Lake the fol-
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lowing July 2nd or 3rd (R. 86), and on or about July 5th 
he telephoned defendants' office and again talked with de-
fendant Rulon Burton. The latter testified that the 'phone call 
was on Saturday, July 7th, and that he told plaintiff he would 
have defendant F. G. Burton get in touch with plaintiff. De-
fendant F. G. Burton was not at his place of business when 
plaintiff called. The next business day-Monday, July 9th-
defendant F. G. Burton telephoned plaintiff and made an ap-
pointment to meet plaintiff the next day, July lOth. Pursuant 
to such appointment, defendants F. G. Burton and Hubert 
Cochran went to plaintiff's place of business on Highland Drive 
in Salt Lake City and held a discussion with plaintiff at that 
time. In the ·course of such meeting the two defendants of-
fered plaintiff the $3300.00 (R. 132) called for under the 
agreement of June 19th. Plaintiff testified that he thereupon 
refused to accept the $3300.00 (R. 91). In refusing the money, 
plaintiff told the two defendants he had an offer from his 
employee Jim Mull to buy plaintiff's business for $4000.00 
(R. 90). The next day, July 11th, defendant F. G. Burton 
called plaintiff and again endeavored to perform defendants' 
part of the contract by paying $33{)0.00, but plaintiff said 
the deal was off (R. 138). 
Not being able to close the purchase with plaintiff and 
obtain the decorating materials upon which defendants were 
depending for fulfillment of the aforementioned sixty custo-
mers' contracts, defendants, because of the unavailability of 
the decorating materials from any other source in the area, were 
forced to make arrangements for performance of the con-
tracts, which they did by asstgntng the same to the above-
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mentioned Mr. Barnes of Provo. It was stipulated (R. 170) 
that in the event the jury found for defendants and against 
plaintiff, the defendants' damages suffered from loss of antici· . 
pated profits on the customers' contracts would be $500.00. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the 
amount of $25 50.00? from which defendants appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH APPELLANTS 
INTEND TO RELY 
POINT NO. I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO 
EVIDENCE THAT THE MARKET VALUE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S BUSINESS WAS LESS THAN THE CONTRACT 
PRICE OF $3300.00 WHEN PLAINTIFF RESCINDED TIIE 
CONTRACT. 
(a) The evidence shows that the market value of plain-
_ tiff's business was not less than $3300.00 during the period 
from June 15, 1951, to on or about June 25, 1951. 
(b) The evidence shows that the market value of plaintiffs 
business was in excess of $3300.00 after June 25, 1951, up to 
and including July 11, 1951. 
(c) There is no evidence at all in the case that plaintiff's 
business during the period when plaintiff rescinded the contract 
had a market value of only $750.00. 
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POINT NO. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE JURY'S VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTER-
NATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL, FOR THE REASON THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS UNDER A LEGAL DUTY TO 
MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES, AND THE EVIDENCE CON-
CLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DIS-
CHARGE THIS DUTY. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN THEIR BE-
HALF NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR FOR 
A NEW TRIAL, FOR THE REASON THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
REFUSAL TO ACCEPT $3300.00 FROM DEFENDANTS 
NOW ESTOPS HIM FROM RECOVERING FROM DE-
FENDANTS. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR 
-
THE REASON THAT NO HARM TO THE PLAINTIFF 
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POINT NO. V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO 
EVIDENCE THAT THE MARKET VALUE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S BUSINESS WAS LESS THAN THE CONTRACT 
PRICE OF $3300.00 WHEN PLAINTIFF RESCINDED THE 
CONTRACT. 
In its Instruction No. 2 (R. 183) the Court made a finding 
that plaintiff had rescinded the contract of sale, but the Court 
told the jury to determine when the recission took place, and. 
whether such rescission was justified. By its Instruction No. 16 
(R. 188) the Court told the jury that if it found for the 
plaintiff, his damages would be ascertained by deducting the 
market value of his business on the date of plaintiff's rescission· 
from $3 300.00, the contract price. 
The jury's verdict does not disclose the time when the 
plaintiff rescinded the contract. However, upon the evidence, 
it could not have been earlier than June 25, 1951, the date 
upon which plaintiff claimed he. returned to Salt Lake from 
Elko, and also the date upon which he clain1ed payment of the 
$3,300.00 was due. The rescission could not have been later 
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than July 11, 1951, for upon that date the plaintiff and de-
fendants held their final negotiations with respect to the con~ 
tract. The plaintiffs damage~ if any, must therefore be de~ 
termined on the basis of whatever the market value of his 
business was on the date when plaintiff rescinded the contract 
between June 25 and July 11, 1951, inclusive. 
What, then, is the evidence of market value during that 
period? 
(a) T be evidence shows that the market value of plaintiff's 
business was not less than $3300.00 during the period from 
June 15, 1951, to on or about June 25, 1951. 
The plaintiff's following testimony (R. 81) given in cross 
examination reveals the market value of his business on or about 
June 15, 1951: 
"Q. Did you consider that the $3300.00 was a fair price 
for your stock in trade and your good will and all 
of your business ? 
A. Well, yes. I thought that that would be all right. 
Q. And you had been working in the business for 30 
some odd years, and had built up a reputation and 
acquired some business contacts ? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And this material and so forth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you felt that was a fair price to you? 
A~ Yes. 
Q. Did you consider that to be a price which you could 
get upon the market? · 
10 
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_r\. Well, that is questionable. The stock of used deco-
rations, I considered the good "'ill and the busi-
ness, \Vhat help I could place, where I had done 
work as a part of that stock in trade? 
Q. That is what I mean, Mr. Nasner; you felt because 
of the efforts and time and all of the experience 
you had ~ put into your business there over the 
years, that that was worth something, and you 
included that in the price you made to these gentle-
men? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that you did feel that the $3300.00 was a fair 
market value price for your business ? 
A Y ,, . es. 
The foregoing testimony, as immediately preceding testi-
mony shows, was concerned with the market value on the date 
of the meeting of plaintiff and defendants which was on or 
about June 15, 1951. 
The lengthy direct and cross-exatnination of plaintiff shows 
that plaintiff had broad experience in his particular line 
of business. It discloses that he was not. a newcomer to the 
field but had been in it for forty years (R. 96). Accordingly, 
his testimony as to the value of his business was based upon 
day-to-day experience covering a long period of time, during 
which he had commercial dealings with many organizations 
and public authorities. His testimony was therefore highly 
significant. He testified that the market value of his business 
on or about the 15th day of June, 1951, was $3 300.00 (R. 81). 
Plaintiffs own words as to market value on June 25, 1951, 
presented on cross-examination are as follows (R. 96): 
11 
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"Q. Mr. Nasner, what do you feel would be the value--
what was the value, of your business on or about 
the 25th of June? 
A. Well, maybe I haven't set a price. 
Q. Maybe I can rephrase it. Let me ask this question. 
Do you feel its value on the 25th of June was any 
different than that on the 15th of June? 
A. Why no, there was a price set. 
Q. So the market value was still the same, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have been in this business for 30 years you 
say? 
A. Yes, 40 years." 
Plaintiff's foregoing testimony plainly establishes that the 
market value was at least $3300.00 between June 15 and on 
or about June 25, 1951. No evidence whatsoever was presented 
showing a market value less than $3300.00 during that time. 
(b) The evidence shows that the market value of plain-
tiff's business was in excess of $3300.00 after June 25, 1951, 
up to and including July 10, 1951. 
The plaintiff testified on cross-examination that on the 
occasion of the final meeting of the plaintiff with defendants 
F. G. Burton and Hubert Cochran on July 10, 1951, those 
two defendants told him they had the money to do business, 
and that he replied by saying they put him on the spot since 
he had received an offer of $4,000.00 from his employee, Jim 
Mull. The plaintiffs testimony on cross examination as to these 
matters is especially significant .(R. 89-90) : 
12 
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"Q. Did you have any discussion there with these gentle-
men? 
A. Why, yes. 
Q. And will you tell us the substance of that conver-
sation? 
A. Well, they said· then that they had the money. 
Q. How much? 
A. Well, they did not specify the amount, but they 
said they had the money. They may have said , 
$3300.00. I don't remember that, but they said they 
had the money to do business, so I told them, I 
said, uy ou put me on a kind of a spot. I have waited 
all this time, and I was supposed to get the money 
on the 25th, and I haven't heard anything from 
you since, and I have had Mr. James Mull working 
with me. When I got back to Elko I told him that 
I hadn't got the money, the deal wasn't closed." 
((Well," he said, ((if you don't sell them, why I will 
take--! would like to get a chance to make an offer 
to take the business. I think I can raise the cash" 
and he offered me $4000.00. 
Q. Cash? 
A. No, he was going to realize the cash.'' 
The following additional testimony of plaintiff on cross 
examination, respecting the Mull offer, contains further evi-
dence of the value of his business (R. 90) : 
'Q. So he would pay $4000.00 in cash to you? 
A. I don't know whether it was-not said in exactly 
cash, but he said he would work with me until he 
could realize the cash. 
Q. You told these gentlemen that? 
13 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. So I told them I had waited all this time, 'you put me 
on the spot', and I said, 'I have got this offer, and 
that is what I want now.' If I could get the cash 
and make an arrangement with this other man to 
help until he could raise the other money.' '' 
In North Anzerican Telegraph Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry Co. 
2 54 Fed. 417, it was held proper to receive in evidence to prove 
market value, testimony as to offers made in good faith for 
property of like character. There is no evidence showing that 
the offer of Mr. Mull to purchase the business for $4000.00 
was not made in good faith. Accordingly, the evidence of the 
offer was properly received to show the market value of the 
plaintiff's business. 
It is quite apparent from the above testimony that plain· 
tiff would not sell on July 10 or 11, 1951, because he had a deal 
to sell to a third party for $4000.00 and the value of his prop· 
erty had increased. This must be the latest date he could have 
rescinded. It is equally apparent from the foregoing testimony 
that plaintiff would have accepted $4000.00 from defendants 
for his business on July 10, 1951. Defendant F. G. Burton 
(R. 132) and defendant Hubert Cochran (R. 164) confirmed 
plaintiff's testimony that he informed them at that final meeting 
that he would sell to them for $4000.00. Although this offer 
of plaintiff to sell for $4000.00 was not accepted by defendants, 
nevertheless, it is important, for it is evidence as to the value 
of the business on or about July 10, 1951. 
Springer v. City of Chicago, 135 Ill. 552, 26 N.E. 514, 
14 
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12 L.R.A. 609, is a case where the question of establishing 
value was in issue. In its opinion the Court announced on 
page 514 this doctrine: 
nWhile we do not think the offer of an owner of 
property to sell at a certain price would be conclusive 
evidence of the value of the property, yet we do think 
that an offer by the owner to sell is competent evidence 
against him as an admission in fixing the value at or 
near the time the offer was made." 
In the face of all the evidence showing the value of plain-
tiff's business during the period in question as being not less 
than $3 300.00, there is no question of fact and further no 
evidence on which the jury could have reached a verdict hold-
ing, in effect, that the market value was less than $3-300.00 
during said period. 
(c) There is no evidence at all in the case that plaintiff} s 
business during the period wben plaintiff rescinded the contract 
had a market value of only $750.00. The latter amount is the 
difference between $3300.00, the contract price, and $2550.00 
the amount of the jury's verdict. 
The $750.00 figure was undoubtedly derived from testi-
mony of plaintiff's witness, James Silvers. On direct examina-
tion Silvers testified he would have paid plaintiff $750.00 for 
all of the stock which plaintiff had down in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
on May 15, 1951 (R. 51). On cross examination the same 
witness testified that plaintiff had only''about 60% of his stock 
or 75,. or 80% of his stock down there with him" (R. 62). 
It is to be noted also that the witness Silvers' testiri1ony 
as to the value of the stock had reference to May 15, 1951, 
15 
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and not to any time thereafter. But in apparently accepting the 
figure $750.00 as the value of plaintiff's stock, the jury totally 
disregarded the testimony of the witness Silvers that the 
$750.00 represented only 60%, 75% or at most 80% of the 
plaintiff's stock. If 80% of plaintiff's stock was worth only 
$750.00, what about the remaining 20%? It is manifest that 
the jury erroneously assumed $750.00 as being the value of 
plaintiff's enti.re stock and business, and accordingly included, 
without sufficient cause, only that amount in arriving at its 
verdict. But even in relying on Silvers' testimony as to the 
market value, the jury should have allowed no less than $938.00 
as the market value, since the latter amount would be the 
value of 100% of plaintiff's stock on the basis that $750.00 
was equal to the value of 80% of the stock. It is plain the jury 
closed its eyes to part of the evidence and, for reasons not 
apparent, decided that $750.00 should be given as a credit 
to defendants, and deducted from the $3300.00 contract pur-
chase price in reaching the verdict of $2550.00 for plaintiff. 
In any event, the market value at the date of rescission was at 
least $3300.00 and the jury's verdict for the plaintiff is not 
supported and was clearly contrary to all the evidence. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE JURY'S VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTER~ 
NATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL, FOR THE REASON THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS UNDER A LEGAL DUTY TO 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES, AND THE EVIDENCE CON-
CLUSIVEL1T SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DIS-
CHARGE THIS DUTY. 
-
It is generally recognized that on a breach of a sale con-
tract by a buyer, the seller must miniinize or keep down his 
damages so far as it is reasonably within his power to do so. 
The buyer cannot be charged with damages which, with rea-
sonable effort, the seller could have prevented ( 46. Am. Jur. 
769). 
And in Volume 15 of the same authority at Page 426, 
appears the following: 
~~One deprived of the fruits of a contract must use 
the efforts of a reasonably prudent man to put himself 
in as good position as he would have been if the con-
tract had not been violated. He must do nothing to 
aggravate his loss, but must do all he reasonably can 
to mitigate or reduce it. He cannot recover for that 
which he might reasonably have avoided." 
Furthermore, this universally recognized principle of law 
is expressed in very cogent terms in Sutherland on Damages, 
Vol. II, 4th Ed., at Page 2257, thusly: 
(Cit is a well established rule that a party to a contract 
which has been broken by the other party must so con-
duct his affairs, after he has knowledge of the breach, 
as to lessen the damage he may sustain as the result 
of it; and to the extent that loss can be avoided the 
vendee will be relieved from liability." 
In Warren v. Stoddart, 105 U. S. 224, 26 L. Ed 117 at 
Page 2 30 the Court declared: 
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((Where a party is entitled to the benefit of a c~ntract 
and can save himself from a loss arising from a breach 
of it at a triflling expense or with reasonable e~ertion, 
it is his duty to do it, and he can charge the dehnquent 
with such damages only as with reasonable endeavors 
and expense he could not prevent." 
This rule of law has long been adhered to for it was 
early laid down by Judge Selden in Hamilton v. McPherson, 
28 N.Y. 72, at Page 76, is the following convincing language: 
((The law, for wise reasons, imposes upon a party 
subjected to injury from a breach of contract the ef-
fective duty of making reasonable exertions to render 
the injury as light as possible. Public interest and sound 
morality accord \vith the law in demanding this; and 
if the injured party, through negligence or wilfulness, 
allO\\'S the damages to be unnecessarily enhanced, the 
increased loss justly falls upon him." 
Inasmuch as the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, it 
must be assumed that under the Court's instructions the jury 
found the defendants had breached the contract and that 
plaintiff had rescinded the same. 
It is beyond question, however, that the plaintiff, after 
rescinding the contract, was in a position to mitigate entirely 
the loss of which he now complains. The plaintiff's suit is for 
$3300.00 and at the meeting of plaintiff and the two defend-
ants F. G. Burton and Hubert .Cochran on July 10, 1951, 
they offered to pay him $3300.00, the amount called for by 
the agreement of June 19, 1951. But, by plaintiff's own ad-
tnission on the witness stand, he refused outright on July lOth 
to sell to defendants for $3300.00. The plaintiff was not ques-
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tioned on direct examination about the July lOth meeting, but 
he was cross examined at length concerning that meeting. From 
plaintiff's testimony as to what was said at that meeting it 
is clear that plaintiff was not interested in the defen~ants' 
$3-300.00, since, as he told defendants at that time, he had 
an offer of $4000.00 from his employee Jim Mull. In his 
own words on cross examination, here is what he said on July 
10, 1951 to defendants concerning that $4,000.00 offer (R. 90): 
ttA. I have got this offer (from Mull) and that is what 
I '' want now ... 
Plaintiff's testimony on his refusal to accept defendants' 
$3300.00 is as follows (R. 90-91): 
nQ. Now on the ocasion when they met out at your 
place, and they offered you the $3300, and said they 
had the money, you turned them down;•is that cor-
rect? 
A. Well, I had this promise pending. 
Q. And you felt it would be more to your advantage, 
of course, to make the $4000 deal than the $3300; 
is that right, so you told these gentlemen you would 
not sell to them for $3 300, is that correct? 
A. I guess that is the way it is, yes." 
* * * 
''Q. As I see it, Mr. Nasner, you have not been willing 
to sell to Mr. Fielding Burton the business for $3300 
at all times ? 
A. Well, with the exception of that one case. 
Q. So that you refused to sell to them for the $3300 
on that occasion, is that correct? 
A. On that one occasion, yes." 
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That ·~one occasion,'' as all the pertinent testimony shows, 
was at the meeting of plaintiff and the two defendants on July 
10, 1951. 
Not only did plaintiff testify that he refused to accept 
the $3300.00 from defendants on July lOth, but he then refused 
to recognize the contract and said he wanted $4,000.00. 
Testimony of defendants amply confirms plaintiff's ad· 
mission that he refused to accept their tender of performance 
and payment of $3300.00 (R. 132, 163). Had there been any 
question raised in the minds of plaintiff or his counsel at the 
trial that plaintiff may have been honestly in error in testifying 
on cross examination that he had refused defendants' offer 
of $3300.00 on July lOth, 1951, counsel would have undoubt-
edly endeavored to clarify the matter when plaintiff was re-
called for redirect examination. But no attempt at such clari-
fication was made (R. 169). There was no evidence whatso-
ever on either side controverting in any fashion the clear 
admission by plaintiff that he refused to accept defendants' 
offer of performance and tender of $3300.00 on July 10, 1951. 
By such refusal plaintiff totally failed to perform the 
duty to mitigate damages which the authorities and the cases 
above cited imposed upon him. It is not a question of whether 
he exercised reasonable diligence to mitigate the impact of 
the loss caused by the alleged default of defendants. His 
admitted rejection of the defendants' offer was hardly an act 
which a person of ordinary prudence would have performed 
if he had had any intention of collecting the $3300.00 from 
defendants. Under the rule set forth in 15 Am. Jur. 426, Supra, 
the plaintiff failed "to use the efforts of a reasonably prudent 
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n1an to put himself in as good position as he would have been 
if the contract had not been violated., 
Despite a careful search of the decisions in this and 
other jurisdictions, counsel for defendants have been unable 
to find any case vlith facts the same as or similar to those pre-
sented in the case a bar. There are, however, numerous deci-
sions in \vhich the courts have applied a rule of la\v which 
by analogy would strongly appear to fit this case. 
In the case of Flicke1na v. Henry Kraker Co. et al., 252 
Mich. 406, 23,3 N.W. 362, the plaintiff was discharged from 
employment by his employer, the defendant. Plaintiff sued, 
claiming that he had been wrongfully terminated. The de-
fendant testified that shortly after the termination he offered 
to take plaintiff back in the same position and at the same 
salary as had existed under the previous employment. The 
defendants requested the court to charge that if defendants 
offered to take plaintiff back into their employ and plaintiff 
refused, plaintiff could not recover. The court refused so to 
charge and upon judgment being returned in favor of plaintiff, 
defendants appealed. The higher court reversed the decision and 
sent the case back for a new trial on the ground that the lower 
court had erred in refusing to give the requested instruction. 
In its decision the Court stated in part, at p. 363, as follows: 
"If an employee is illegally discharged, it becomes 
his duty to seek other employment of like nature, and 
the burden is upon the defendant to sho\v that the em-
ployee could have obtained like etnployment with a 
reasonable effort ... This burden is sustained by the 
defendant, if he shows that he offered to reinstate the 
plaintiff in his former position at the same salary." 
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By para phrasing the above language, the ruling can be 
readily fitted to the case at bar and the applicable principle of 
law preserved as follows: 
''If the buyers under a contract to purchase a busi-
ness, breach the contract by failing to pay the contract 
price when due, it becomes the duty of the seller to 
find another buyer, and the burden is upon the defend-
ant buyers to show that the plaintiff seller could have 
sold the business with reasonable effort. This burden is 
sustained by the defendants if they show that shortly 
after the breach they offered the full purchase. price 
to the plaintiff seller." 
The court also observed in the Flickema case in treating 
the question of mitigation of damages, at page 363: 
"Such an offer as defendants claim they made was 
clearly admissible in mitigation of damages which in 
the present case would have been almost the entire 
claim of plaintiff.'' 
And so it is in the case in this appeal. The offer of defend-
ants was equal to the entire amount of the claim of plaintiff 
in this action. The defendants clearly sustained the burden 
resting upon them by showing their offer to pay the full pur-
chase price of $3300.00, and nowhere in the case was the fact 
of such offer denied or disputed but conversely, it was frankly 
admitted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's own admission of re-
fusing to accept the defendants' offer fully sustains the de-
fen;tants' burden. For other cases in which the same principle 
of law is followed see the following: 
Squire v. Wright, 1 Mo. App. 172 
Dary t'. J·he Carolina Miller, ( 1888, D.C.) 36 F. 507 
Stockrnan v. Slater Bros. Cloak & Suit Co. ( 1920) 182 
N.Y. Supp. 815. 
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POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' l\10TION FOR JUDGMENT IN THEIR BE-
HALF NOTWIT~TANDING THE VERDICT, OR FOR 
A NEW TRIAL, FOR THE REASON THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
REFUSAL TO ACCEPT $3300.00 FROM DEFENDANTS 
NOW ESTOPS HIM FROM RECOVERING FROM DE-
FENDANTS. 
The plaintiff claitns that defendants defaulted on the con-
tract and failed to pay him the $3 300.00 agreed upon for 
his business. Yet very shortly after the time he claims the 
payment was due he flatly refused, according to his own un-
contradicted testimony, to accept the $3300.00 from defend-
ants on July 10, 1951. If plaintiff actually had a claim against 
defendants for breach of contract, it was a claim having an 
undetermined. value. In acting upon that claim, several courses 
were open to plaintiff. He could assert it or abandon it. He 
could not consistently do both. When defendants offered 
$3300.00 to plaintiff on July 10, 1951, he was faced with 
making an election of which course to follow. In his own 
words, plaintiff declared that when the defendants offered him 
the money on that day he said to them, "You put me on the 
spot'' (R. 90) . 
The plaintiff said that because at that very moment he 
had pending before him the offer of $4,000.00 which he had 
previously received from his employee Jim Mull. The temp-
tation to realize more financially from the Mull offer \Vas 
irresistible, and plaintiffs decision to refuse the lesser offer 
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of defendants is understandable. Plaintiff simply elected to 
decline what appeared to be the least favorable of two offers. 
For some reason not disclosed at the trial the offer by Mr. 
Mull did not ripen into payment. Six months later the plaintiff 
brought this action to force the defendants to pay him exactly 
that which he had previously refused to accept. 
The courts and authorities have dealt with the problem 
here involved and have developed over the years a principle 
of law which they have consistently applied in the solution 
of that problem. This principle is known as "quasi estoppel" 
and is defined in 19 Am. Jur. 636, as follows: 
·'Quasi estoppel includes such matters as the doctrine 
of 'election; the principle which precludes a party from 
asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent 
\vith a position previously taken by him . " 
On page 650 of the same volume we read: 
(<Generally speaking, a party will not be permitted to 
occupy inconsistent positions or to take a position in 
regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or in-
consistent with, one previous! y assumed by him, at 
least where he had, or \vas chargeable with, full knowl-
edge of the facts and another will be prejudiced by 
his action . . . As has already been pointed out, this rule 
is sometimes said not to be stricti y one of equitable 
estoppel, but rather one of quasi estoppel by election 
. . . This principle operates to preclude one who pre-
vents a thing from being done from availing himself 
of the non-performance which he has himself occa-
sioned." 
Bigelow on Estoppel, 6th Ed., Page 732, covers the sub-
ject in the following forceful terms; 
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t tA party cannot either in the course of litigation or 
in dealings in pais occupy inconsistent positions ... 
And where a man has an election between several in-
consistent courses of action, he will be confined to that 
which he first adopts, the election if made with kno~r l-
edge of the facts, is in itself binding-it cannot be 
\\'ithdra,vn \vithout due consent; it cannot be withdrawn 
though it has not been acted upon by another by any 
change of position." 
If we apply to the case at bar the rule elicited from the 
above and other numerous sources of general recognized 
authority, it will be readily seen that the plaintiff has no right 
of recovery against defendants. Plaintiff's testimony on cross 
examination abundanti y shows that his act of refusing de-
fendant's offer of $3,300.00 was taken with full knowledge 
on his part. Under the rule explained by Bigelow above, plain-
tiff's election to refuse defendants' offer cannot be withdrawn, 
even though defendants may not have acted upon such refusal 
by a change of position. But defendants did act on plaintiff's 
rejection by assigning the sixty customers' contracts to Mr. 
Barnes of Provo, and upon which defendants suffered damages 
in the sum of $500.00, as stipulated by the parties (R. 189). 
In 29 A1n. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.), at Page 1103, 
we find the following significant language: 
(tA person who does a positive act which according 
to its natural import is so inconsistent with the enforce-
ment of a right in his favor as to induce a reasonable 
belief that such right has been dispensed with will be 
deemed to have waived it." 
It \vould be difficult to conceive of a case in which the 
postive act of a party, which, according to its natural import, 
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would be more inconsistent with the enforcement of a right 
in his favor than in the present situation, where plaintiff having 
once wholly refused the $3300.00 now claims the right to 
compel its payment to him. By unqualifidely rejecting the de-
fendants' offer the plaintiff must be deemed to have forever 
waived the right to enforce whatever claim he may have had 
against the defendants. 
It is the position of defendants that plaintiff must abide 
by the consequences of his own act. The cases so hold. Casey 
v. Gali, 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. Ed. 168. 
Plaintiff had a choice of two opposite remedies. He 
could have rejecte~ defendants' offer to pay the $3300.00 on 
July 10, 1951, or he could have accepted it. He chose to reject 
it and instead followed a course which proved valueless. Such 
election must exclude and bar the prosecution of the remedy 
which he turned aside. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR 
THE REASON THAT NO HARM TO THE PLAINTIFF 
RESULTED FROM ANY FAULT ON THE PART OF DE-
FENDANTS. 
If the plaintiff has suffered a loss, it is because he failed 
and refused to protect himself when he had the opportunity 
to collect the $3300.00 offered to him by the defendants on 
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July 10, 1951. Even though the offer from Jim Mull of 
$4,000.00 failed to materialize into a completed sale of plain-
tiffs business, and notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff may 
not have been able to dispose of his business to others and 
despite the fact, if it is a fact, that his business may not now 
be \VOrth the $3300.00 for which he agreed to sell to the 
defendants, he cannot lay the blame for these adverse results 
at the door of the defendants. The harm, if any, which he has 
suffered is the product of his own action and is not attributable 
to the failure on th part of defendants to . perform a duty 
resting upon them. As heretofore shown under Point IL; of 
this brief, when the defendants offered the $3300.00 to plain-
tiff, he was under a duty to accept that offer if he intended 
thereafter to hold the defendants liable to him for breach of 
the contract to purchase his business. Since he refused their 
offer, the harm, if any, thereafter suffered by the plaintiff 
stemmed from his own failure to act at the time when per-
formance on his part was mandatory. Plaintiff places himself 
in the anomalous position of rejecting defendants' offer to . 
perform while he negotiates a better deal and when that failed 
to materialize plaintiff sues defendants for damages for non-
performance of the contract. It is clearly a case of where 
plaintiff is trying to keep defendants in a state of indefinite 
suspense while he seeks to develop something which is more 
to his advantage than that which defendants offered to him 
in full performance of the contract. The plaintiff cannot be 
permitted to occupy such a position and force defendants to 
account for a loss, if any, which was of his own making. 
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POINT NO. V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE. 
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
Defendants' requested Instruction No. 4 (R. 199) which 
was refused by the court, would, if given, have properly pre· 
sented to the jury the matter of considering the refusal of 
the plaintiff to sell for less than $4,000.00. In the light of de .. 
fendants' requested Instruction No. 4 the jury would have 
unquestionably found under the evidence that the defendants 
were ready, willing and able to pay the $}300.00 to plaintiff 
upon the occasion of their last meeting on July 10, 1951, and 
that nevertheless plaintiff wrongfully refused to sell to de· 
fendants at that time and place for $3300.00. Under the 
authorities referred to in point Il of this brief, imposing a 
duty upon the plaintiff to mitigate his damages, it was definite 
error on the part of the Honorable District Judge to refuse to 
give defendants' requested Instruction No. 4. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants submit that the action of the District Court 
in refusing to grant defendants' motion for judgment not· 
withstanding the verdict or in the alternative to grant a new 
trial \vas error since ( 1) no damage resulted to plaintiff, 
( 2) plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages and ( 3) plaintiff 
is by the rule of quasi-estoppel prevented from. recovering 
from defendants. Defendants also submit that it was error 
for the court below to refuse to grant defendants' m~tion for 
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a directed verdict, since no harm to the plaintiff arising out 
of any fault on the part of the defendants has been demon-
strated in this la,vsuit; and that it was also error for the court 
to refuse to grant defendants' requested Instruction No. 4 
under \vhich the jury could have found that plaintiff wrong-
fully refused to sell to defendants for $3300.00. 
For all of the foregoing reasons it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and that instructions should be issued to the lower court to 
enter judgment for defendants in the amount of $544.98 and 
costs. 
Respectfully _,mitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN and RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
